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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
RAY WAYNE PIERCE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 10279 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant has appealed his conviction for the crime 
of second degree murder in the Third Judicial District. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged with the crime of murder in 
the first degree for the killing of Kenneth Jack Vaught in 
Salt Lake City on May 28, 1964. A jury trial in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, resulted in the appel-
lant's conviction for the lesser crime of second degree mur-
der. The appellant was committed to the Utah State Prison 
for an indeterminate term. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent State of Utah submits that the conviction 
should be affirmed. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent State of Utah submits the followincr 
·~ 
statement of facts as being a more correct statement of \\hat 
the record, in fact, reveals. 
On May 28, 1964, the appellant was residing at 462 
South 5th East under the name of Ray Ross ( R. 96). On 
that day the appellant's friend, the deceased, began sniffing 
airplane glue at approximately 12: 00 noon ( R. 260). Snif-
fing glue results in giving the f ecling of being high or intoxi-
cated (R. 271, 504). The appellant also started to sniff 
glue at approximately 4: 00 or 4: 30 p.m. on the 28th of 
May ( R. 258), although the amount he consumed up until 
the time of the crime is in dispute. At about 4: 00 p.m. the 
appellant went to pay a traffic ticket, to buy glue, to a car 
mart, and returned at about 6: 30 p.m. ( R. 262). After 
appellant returned to his apartment he left again ( R. 263 I. 
The appellant returned to his apartment at about 9: 30 p.m. 
( R. 266, 515) . According to the statement given police 
after the crime, appellant could recall his address, cmplo:-
ment, schooling, and could recall with some degree of 
specificity where he had been from 5: 00 p.m. on the 28th of 
May until the murder ( R. 502-511 ) .1 
When appellant returned at 9: 00 p.m. he saw the \·ictim, 
Kenny Vaught, who was still in his apartment. Vaught \\3' 
crying ( R. 266), and according to the appellant's testimony 
at trial, the following occurred ( R. 266) : 
"A. I guess he was crying. Or he wasn't crying, he 
was sad or something. But he told me about thcsr 
People that were fiahtinrr over him \\ hcthcr hr \1·ould a a ' 
go with the colored or the white people. And I guess 
he wanted me, he wanted me to sec the people. And 
1 The statement given police \\as not rccci\·f·cl as ;rn admission hut as stipu-
lated evidence, thus raising it to the same le\ el as tcstilllo!ly ( R. 199) · 
3 
told me, 'You can't see them with the light. It has got 
to be dark.' And so he told me, he told me to go sit in 
the corner of the room and tum the light off and he 
\\'oulcl sit in the rocking chair. And I says - all right 
- and I got up and \\·ent and sat in the comer of the 
bed and turned the light off. I'm not sure how long it 
\\as bet\\ een the time he told me they were here. He 
told me they were here and I jumped up and turned 
the light on. And he was scratching at the wall and 
told me they went through the wall. And he says -
I want to try it again. And I said - all right. And so 
I got up, I got up on the corner of the bed. And the 
next thing I remember I turned the light on and here 
was Kenny in the rocking chair bleeding." 
In his statement to the police, he said ( R. 510) : 
"A. I asked him [Kenny Vaught J what was the 
matter, and he says, 'Nothing'; and I kept asking him 
what was the matter and he says, 'Nothing'. So he 
says, 'All right I'll tell you'; and he says, 'I was sitting 
on the edge of the bed here and there was a colored 
man sitting in the white rocking chair and I was 
talking to him', and he says, 'there was a bunch of 
white people and colored people arguing about which 
way I should go, colored or white'; and he said he was 
dancing with one colored man, and he said he was 
dancing the way colored people dance, I don't know 
how that is, but he suggested that I get over in the 
corner of the bed and that we tum the light out and 
he'd sit in the rocking chair and wait and see if they 
come back, and then in about ten or fifteen minutes he 
jumped up and said, 'They're here' and I jumped up 
and turned the light on and he was in the comer 
scratching at the wall; and then he says, 'They went 
through the wall'; and then he says, 'Let's try it again, 
you get back in the corner and turn the light out'; and 
I'm not sure, but I think I took my knife out of my 
pocket and opened it up." 
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The knife had originally been given the appellant by the 
deceased ( R. 511 ) . The appellantfurther stated ( R. 512): 
"Q. Did you believe that there were other people in 
the room? 
A. Not really, but I don't know what it was. 
Q. Now when you turned the light out the second 
time, you had the knife in your hand and the blade 
was open? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What happened then? 
A. Well, I went over in the corner and waited for 
them, and in about no more than five minutes he 
jumped up and said, 'They're here' and I don't know 
what I did, I refuse to answer that. 
Q. Do you recall hearing him stand up? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. You don't know whether he stood up or not? 
A. No. 
Q. But he did state they were there? Then you state 
you started stabbing? 
A. No, I didn't state that, I remember I had the 
knife in my hand and the next thing I know I had the 
light on and Kenny was laying in the chair. 
Q. How many people were in the room at this time? 
A. Just me and Kenny." 
The deceased and the appellant were the only two seen in 
the room by other tenants (R. 189, 193), and appellant 
stated that he didn't believe anyone else was present (R. 
512). 
The deceased died of a knife wound in the chest ( R 
142), although he also had stab wounds in the right shoul-
der, lower right leg and across his nose ( R. 134). The ap-
pellant, after the stabbing, threw his knife under the bed, 
then retrieved it and put it on the bed ( R. 514). He at-
tempted mouth to mouth resuscitation ( R. 514), and then 
ran to the neighboring tenants, asking them to get a doctor 
and stating, "I killed him. I killed him," or "I stabbed him," 
!R.190, 117, 122, 154,305). 
The appellant had, a short time before the killing, indi-
cated that he would kill to get what he wanted, and would 
kill the deceased if he had something he wanted ( R. 163) . 
Appellant admitted making such a statement at trial (R. 
285). The deceased's wallet containing about $25 was 
found on the appellant after the stabbing (R. 290, 156--
159, 471, 288). 
The appellant at no time testified that he was stabbing 
ghosts, and told the police he did not believe anyone was 
actually in the room with him and the deceased, and that he 
believed he stabbed the deceased (R. 512, 513) .2 Addi-
tionally, at the time of trial, the appellant himself testified 
(R. 288): 
"Q. Now all of this story about these people coming 
through the wall was what Kenny told you, isn't that 
true? 
A. Yessir. 
Q. You never saw them, did you? 
A. No sir." 
Further, appellant admitted at trial that what he told the 
police, about believing others were not in the room, was true 
(R. 299). The appellant's defense was based on temporary 
'Contrary to the assertions in appellant's brief that appellant was not sure 
what had happened, but he was stabbing ghosts (App. Brief, p. 3), the record 
at page 518 (T. 444), shows only an attempt to impeach the testimony of a 
police officer by that given at preliminary hearing where the officer said 
IR. 518): 
"When the victim had stated that they were back again he got up 
off of the bed and he wasn't sure what happened. He stated that he had 
stabbed them; stabbed what he thought was the individuals." 
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insanity caused by sniffing airplane glue \\ hich contains a 
toxic element, toluene, which has an affect upon the brain. 
Mr. William Arbuckle, a toxicologist, testified that the 
type of airplane glue used by the deceased and the appellant 
contained toluene which can produce irrational beha\·ior 
if ingested in sufficient quantity ( R. 221 ) . He also indicated 
that many things, such as amount of consumption, period 
of time, body metabolism, etc., would affect a person's rf-
sponse to toluene. 
Dr. Alan Done, a pediatrician, who had done consider-
able research in the field of glue sniffing, noted that partial 
amnesia is consistent with toluene intoxication. He noted 
that an intensive close could produce a bizarre reaction and 
that under such circumstances a person would not ha\·e the 
capacity to think in a rational way, could not distinguish 
between right or wrong, or control himself ( R. 336). The 
doctor noted that there was nothing to show the appellant 
acted in response to hallucinations ( R. 344, 349, 351). He 
also indicated actual behavior would be the most important 
factor in evaluating the extent of toluene influence. 
Dr. Robert Mohr, a psychiatrist, felt that such actions. 
as testified to by the appellant, would be compatible \\ith 
toluene intoxication and that from his examination of thr 
appellant, he was of the opinion that the appellant did not 
know right from wrong, the nature and quality of his act, 
and could not control himself ( R. 383). He f cit such ac-
tions of the appellant would be consistent with a dcliriou> 
state, but noted that his opinion was not based on any direct 
evidence of hallucinations ( R. 431). The doctor was of the 
opinion that a person intoxicated by toluene would be suf-
fering from a mental disease ( R. 432, 377). Dr. Lyndon D. 
Clark was also of the same opinion that such a reaction to 
7 
toluene could be classed as a disease of the mind ( R. 451). 
Dr. Clark \Vas not able to say what dosage would produce 
toxic psychosis ( R. 450, 452), noted hallucinations could 
come and go ( R. 483) , but, in response to standard ques-
tions along the lines of the elements of an insanity defense, 
indicated that he did not believe the appellant was re-
~ponsible ( R. 462) . 
Dr. Louis G. Moench, a psychiatrist who examined the 
accused, testified that he felt the appellant was sane at the 
time of the crime ( R. 466) and merely had a sociopathic 
personality. He indicated that the appellant's recounting of 
the events was reasonably clear except for the instance of 
the stabbing, thus casting doubt on the claim of toxic 
amnesia. 3 He was of the opinion that the appellant's taking 
the wallet evidenced a sociopathic and criminal response, 
that appellant knew right from wrong, could adhere to the 
right, and could and did form the required criminal intent 
( R. 468, 469, 4 71, 4 72). The doctor did not believe the 
appellant participated in the hallucinations experienced by 
the deceased ( R. 4 70). 
Police officers, Glen S. Cahoon and Gerald A. Durrans, 
who saw the appellant immediately after the crime, felt the 
appellant, although excited, appeared normal and was 
coherent ( R. 494, 495). 
Based on the above evidence, the jury returned a verdict 
of guilty of murder in the second degree. 
'Dr. Mohr also testified that the inability to remember a single instance 
would be unusual and incompatible with toluene intoxication (R. 417). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CO!\I!\1IT ERROR I'.\ 
REFUSING TO GI\'E THE APPELLANTS REQl'ESTED I'.'i-
STRUCTIONS ON HALLCCINATIONS AND DELUSIO\S 
SINCE: 
(a) THE COURTS INSTRUCTIONS ON INSANITY Al\IJ 
INTENT WERE SLTFFICIENT. 
(b) THE COURTS Il\'STRCCTI02\!S ON INSA'.\'ITY 
WERE MORE FAVORABLE TO THE APPELLA\T 
THAN THE INSTRLTCTIONS REQL1ESTED. 
(c) THE REQUESTED INSTRCCTIONS WERE CO:\-
TRARY TO THE BETTER REASONED LEGAL POSI-
TION. 
(d) THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT PROPERLY 
FRAMED. 
(e) THE EVIDENCE \\'AS SPECCLATIVE AND DID NOT 
RAISE THE ISSUE. 
(a) The appellant contends that the trial court erred 
in refusing to give requested Instructions 2, 7 and 11, relat-
ing generally to the affect of delusions or hallucinations on 
criminal responsibility. It is submitted that there is no merit 
to that position. During the course of the trial, appellant'' 
counsel, in interrogating expert witnesses, consistently re-
ferred to the standard tests for the defense of insanity. In 
questioning Dr. Alan K. Done, the questions were couched 
in form to raise the usual elements of insanity defense (R. 
334, 336). With specific reference to whether or not the 
appellant committed the crime under the influence of hal-
lucinations, Dr. Done responded as follows (R. 344): 
"Q. Nmv - there is nothing with this Defendant 
that shows that he had hallucinations, is there? 
A. I have heard nothing." 
Dr. Robert C. Mohr, a psychiatrist who was also called 
by the appellant, \Vas also questioned concerning the mental 
9 
condition of the appellant during the commission of the 
crime and responded that in his opinion the appellant could 
not appreciate right from wrong, was unable to know the 
nature and quality of his act, or to avoid committing the act 
(R. 380, 384). Dr. Mohr at one time in his testimony also 
indicated that there was no evidence of hallucinations (R. 
431). However, after reading the statement the appellant 
gave to the police, he seemed to feel that the defendant was 
hallucinating ( R. 443, 444). Dr. Lyndon D. Clark was also 
questioned concerning the appellant's ability to distinguish 
right from wrong, adhere to the right, and appreciate the 
nature and quality of his act ( R. 462). 
The prosecution's rebuttal psychiatrist gave his testimony 
in accord with the standard test for insanity in the State of 
Utah ( R. 464, 469), although differing with appellant's 
experts. The appellant's doctors were generally of the 
opinion that the appellant's condition could be categorized 
as a mental disease ( R. 432, 442, 462). 
The state of the evidence which was presented to the 
jury left them with testimony couched in terms of the usual 
insanity defense. In State v. Poulson, 14 U.2d 213, 381 P.2d 
93 ( 1963), and State v. Kirkham, 7 U.2d 108, 319 P.2d 859 
( 1958), this court accepted the elements for the defense of 
insanity to be: ( 1 ) Whether the accused understood the 
nature and quality of his act; ( 2) could distinguish right 
from wrong, and ( 3) could adhere to the right. 
The court expressly instructed the jury in accord with 
these clements ( R. 525, Instruction 7a). Further, the court 
gave detailed and appropriate instructions on the require-
ment of intent (R. 523, 526, 527, 528). 
It is submitted that under these circumstances the in-
structions requested by the appellant need not have been 
10 
given. It is well settled that where delusions or hallucina-
tions result in criminal conduct which is the product of J 
mental disease, the appropriate defense is one of insaniti. 
Thus in Morris, et al., Studies in Criminal Law ( 196-t), 
at page 62, it is noted: 
"* * *Conscious behavior analogous to automatism 
is either irrcsistable impulse, or, if hallucinations arc 
involved, insanity." 
It is difficult to understand how a person could commit a 
crime while in a hallucinatory and delusional state and at 
the same time appreciate the nature and quality of his act, 
and be able to distinguish right from wrong. Sec Williams, 
Criminal Law, 2d Ed., The General Part, Sec. 166. 
It should be noted that the Af'Naghten case, 10 Clark & 
F. 200, 1 C. & K. 130, 8 English Reports 718 (House of 
Lords 1843), involved in part the issue of a crime com 
mitted under the circumstances of an insane delusion. Sec 
Clark and Marshall, Crimes, 6th Eel., pages 342, 369. The 
judges in the M'Naghten case responded with the "right 
and wrong" test, thus clearly recognizing that the presence 
of a delusion or hallucination docs not necessarily affect 
the test of insanity. 
The rule sometimes said to be applicable when' a cklu-
sionary or hallucinatory condition exists, requiring some 
specific type of hallucination, which, if true, would be a 
defense to the crime actually committee!, is an ab~urclity. 
As is noted in Perkins, Criminal Law, page 755: 
"The delusion test is not required as a matter of 
logic because whenever disease has forced into the 
mind imaginary facts, which cannot br disloclgcd and 
•.vhich if real \\Ould justify or excuse what is done, the 
11 
owner of this disordered mind is in no position to dis-
criminate between right and wrong with reference 
thereto." 
In Keedy, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility, 30 
Harvard Law Review 535, 559 ( 1917), it is stated: 
"* * * Delusion is a symptom of different varieties 
of mental disease and should be considered in connec-
tion with the general symptomatology." 
In W eihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law, 
pages 71 through 72, it is observed that the historical origin 
and basis of some cases recognizing a special rule in the case 
of delusion situations is in fact a fallacious delusion of the 
courts themselves arising from a misinterpretation of Lord 
Erskine's argument in the Hadfield case, 27 Howard State 
Trials 1282. Weihofen, supra, also notes that a delusion is 
not an independent phenomenon by an external symptom 
indicative of a much deeper mental disturbance. 
In Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 P. 756 ( 1915), the 
Colorado Supreme Court, in rejecting the position that an 
insane delusion requires some special judicial treatment, 
noted: 
"* * * Insanity is a disease of the mind and delusion 
is a symptom of the disease." 
Further, as is noted in Weihofen, supra, at page 79: 
"* * * Whatever justification there may be for 
judges' assuming to lay down a legal test of responsi-
bility (which is, after all, a legal and not a medical con-
cept), there is none for the attempt to enunciate from 
the bench a general rule for determining whether a 
particular belief is symptomatic of mental unsound-
ness or not." 
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The better reasoned cases have clearly recognized that 
proper instruction of a jury along the lines of the standard 
insanity defense is adequate where delusion or hallucina-
tions are the symptoms indicative of insanity. Parsons v. 
State, 81Ala.577, 2 So. 854 ( 1887); Woodall v. State, 149 
Ark. 33, 231 S.W. 186 ( 1921); Ryan v. People, supra; 
Kraus v. State, 108 Neb. 331, 187 N.W. 895 ( 1922). Thus, 
in Ryan v. People, supra, the Colorado Supreme Court 
observed: 
"A person who is so diseased in mind at the time of 
the act as to be incapable of distinguishing right from 
wrong \vith respect to it, or being able to so distinguish, 
has suffered such an impairment of mind by disease 
as to destroy the will power and render him incapable 
of choosing the right and refraining from doing- thr 
wrong, is not accountable. And this is true howsoe\·er 
such insanity may be manifested, by insane delusions 
of whatever nature, by irresistible impulse, or other-
. " wise. 
Consequently, it is submitted where as in the insant case 
proper and comprehensive instructions on insanity and 
intent were given, there is no need for meaningless instruc-
tions relating to delusions or hallucinations. 
The appellant contends that State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 
6 P.2d 177 ( 1931), supports his claim. The appellant, 
however, does not point out wherein the Green case would 
rule that the failure to give instructions on delusions and 
hallucinations would be error where instructions on insanit) 
were given. Further, the Green case does not stand for the 
proposition that such instructions must be given. The court 
merely acknowledged that there is a rule of law expressly 
relating to insane delusions or hallucinations, citing 16 C.j., 
Section 76. The court then ruled that the evidence in the 
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case before it did not properly raise the issue. It is submitted 
that the Green case should not be deemed precedent for the 
appellant's position and to the extent that the dicta pro-
nouncement found in that case relating to insane delusions 
has effect, it should be rejected. The court in Green did 
not thoroughly analyze the cases in the field nor did it deter-
mine whether the rule had any validity as against modem 
medical knowledge. Further, the court's statement, that it 
seems settled that there is a special rule relating to insane 
delusions, is totally erroneous. In fact, the great majority of 
cases have rejected such a rule. Thus, Weihofen, Insanity 
as a Defense in Criminal Law, at page 74, notes: 
"This special delusion rule laid down in M'Naghten's 
Case, that a person committing an anti-social act by 
reason of an insane delusion will not be relieved of 
criminal responsibility unless the facts of the delusion 
would constitute a defense if true, has never been 
accepted in the majority of American states. The 
assumption, often made, that this rule has been ac-
corded general acceptance, and must be regarded as 
part of the law in most jurisdictions, is without founda-
tion. As we have seen, it is law today in not more than 
nine states. On the other hand, it has been expressly 
repudiated by the courts of eight jurisdictions, and by 
implication in at least nine others, which have held 
that the general test of responsibility adopted in the 
jurisdiction applies to delusion as to any other mani-
festation of mental disorder, and that there is no 
special test for delusion." 
Further, it is apparent that the delusional theory is at best 
confusing to the jury where the "right and wrong" instruc-
tions are also given. Perkins, Criminal Law, pages 751 to 
755. It is obvious, therefore, that the trial court acted 
properly in rejecting the instructions requested by the ap-
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pellant since the instructions as given adequately advised 
the jury. 
(b) It is submitted that additionally the appellant has 
no basis to claim prejudice since the instructions on insanity 
are more favorable to the appellant than the instructions 
requested. Instruction 7, requested by the appellant, at-
tempts to state the minority rule on delusions and is to the 
effect that if the defendant admits the commission of a 
crime while in a delusional state, he may be acquitted "if 
the facts of his delusional belief would provide a defense.'' 
Thus, under the instruction requested by the appellant, he 
may not have known the nature and quality of his act, or 
able to adhere to the right, or known that what he was doing 
was wrong, but, unless the facts of his hallucination or drlu-
sion would otherwise be reasonable to a sane man, he could 
not be acquitted. Therefore, the instruction requested by 
the appellant placed upon him an additional burden of 
demonstrating that the fact of the hallucination or delusion 
would be exculpatory. The absurdity of this position is 
manifest and it is obvious that such a requirement imposes 
a much greater burden upon the defendant than the in-
structions given. In Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 
( 1887), the Alabama Supreme Court noted as to such a 
concept: 
"* * * If he dare fail to reason, on the supposed facts 
embodied in the delusion, as perfectly as a sane man 
could do on a like state of realities, he receives no 
mercy at the hands of the law." 
In State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, it was stated with reference 
to such a requirement: 
"* * * It is, in effect, saying to the jury, the prisoner 
was mad when he committed the act, but he did not use 
sufficient reason in his madness." 
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In 27 C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 60, it is observed, with 
reference to the delusional rule: 
"***other authorities expressly repudiate this rule 
as holding an admittedly insane person to a standard 
of morality which should be enacted only of the sane, 
and hold that, in the case of partial insanity, an insane 
delusion, which raises in the mind of accused an 
imagined state of facts and so corrupts his mental 
processes that he is incapacitated from distinguishing 
ri,ght from wrong with respect to the act charged, 
affords a defense, even though the imagined state of 
facts, if real, would not have justified a sane man in 
doing the same act." 
This rule has been said to be an "inhumane rule" when 
compared to the A1'Naghten test. Weihofen, supra, Chap-
ter 3. Further, the delusional rule, as contended in Instruc-
tion 7, along with the other instructions posed by the ap-
pellant, is psychiatrically unsound. See Weihofen, supra, 
page 76. 
The landmark case in the area and one of the better 
analyses of the whole field is found in Kraus v. State, 108 
Neb. 331, 187 N.W. 895 ( 1922). In that case the court 
determined that instructions, similar to those requested by 
the appellant here, where given by the trial court, to be 
reversible error. The court felt the appropriate way to 
instruct the jury was along the lines of a general insanity 
instruction. The court stated: 
"* * * Whether or not a person having an insane 
delusion, who is impelled to act by reason of that delu-
sion, is able to distinguish the difference between right 
and wrong, with respect to his act, it seems to us, must 
be determined as a question of fact in each particular 
case, and therefore, that the jury must in all cases 
where the defense of insanity, either partial or total, is 
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presented be required to determine whether or not the 
accused, at the time he committed tlw act, understood 
its nature and comprehended that it was wrong." 
The court noted that generally the rule with reference to 
insane delusions is simply another way of stating the grn-
eral rule with regard to the defense of insanity, citing Cun-
ningham v. State, 56 l'v!iss. 269, 21 Am. Rep. 360, op. cit.. 
p. 898. The court stated, with reference to the requirement 
that facts of any delusion be exculpatory, that such a test 
was improper. It noted: 
"***Whether or not a person suffering from insane 
delusions is yet, by reason of his sanity on other sub-
jects, able to distinguish between right and wrong. 
with regard to the subject-matter as to which he is 
insane, is a question of fact, to be passed upon by the 
jury. An instruction, therefore, in a case presenting 
the defense of partial insanity, which states that a 
person having an insane delusion cannot justify his act 
unless the facts imagined, if true, would have justified 
a sane man, and leaving out the question as to whether 
or not the delusion so perverted and affected the ac-
cused's mind as to incapacitate him from determining 
whether or not his act is right or wrong, does not suf-
ficiently present the issue to the jury. Ryan v. People, 
60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756, L.A.R. 1917F, 646, Ann. 
Cas. 1917 C. 605; Oldham v. People, 61 Colo. 413, 
158 Pac. 148; Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 5 77, 2 South. 
854, 60 Am. Rep. 193; State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 9 
Am. Rep. 242; State v. Keer!, 29 Mont. 508, 75 Pac. 
362, 101 Am. St. Rep. 579; Hotema v. United States, 
186 U.S. 413, 22 Sup. Ct. 895, 46 L.Ed 1225. See notr, 
L.R.A. 1917F, 646." 
It is apparent, therefore, that the instructions as re-
quested by the appellant on hallucinations, had they been 
given, would have imposed a greater burden on the part of 
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the appellant than those given by the court and, hence, the 
appellant could in no way have been prejudiced. 
( c) As noted above, the majority of the courts do not 
fa\·or instructions on delusions and hallucinations. In fact, 
the instructions as requested by the appellant are contrary 
to the better reasoned cases. W eihof en, Insanity as a De-
f 1 nsc in Criminal Law, Chap. 3, Sec. 1; Perkins, Criminal 
Law, page 751; Kraus v. State, supra. Further, it is ques-
tionable whether an individual under hallucinations can 
properly report his own hallucinations. Thus, in Jaspers, 
General Psychopathology ( 1963), it is observed: 
"If we try to get some closer understanding of these 
primary experiences of delusion, we soon find we can-
not really appreciate these quite alien modes of ex-
perience. They remain largely incomprehensible, un-
real and beyond our understanding.Yet some attempts 
ha\·e been made. We find that there arise in the patient 
certain primary sensations, vital feelings, moods, 
a\\·arenesses: 'Something is going on; do tell me what 
on earth is going on', as one patient of Sandberg said 
to her husband. When he asked what she thought was 
going on, the patient said, 'How do I know, but I'm 
certain something is going on.' " 
Further, the form of delusions or hallucinations may vary 
substantially from false perceptions to splitting of percep-
tion, to actual delusional ideas, perceptions and aware-
nesses. Jaspers, supra, page 60 through 104. Consequently, 
it is apparent that the better reasoned cases and those more 
compatible with full use of medical knowledge would 
merely give the jury the general test of criminal responsi-
bility and not confuse the jury with obsolete legal standards 
which may be in conflict with the psychiatric testimony 
given. 
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It is submitted, therefore, that this court should acknowl-
edge that where the proper Af'Naghten plus irresistible im-
pulse test is given that no other instructions should be given 
even though hallucinations or delusions are involved. 
Most recently in Brady v. Attorney General for Northern 
Ireland, [1963] Appeals Cases 386, the House of Lords, in 
considering an appeal from the Court of Appeals from 
Northern Ireland, considered the question of whether the 
trial court had erred in not giving instructions on automa-
tism along with those on insanity. The court ruled that 
where the nature of the actions raised an issue of insanity, 
the instructions on insanity would be adequate to cover the 
defense on all grounds. The court was of the opinion that if 
the actions of the defendant arose from a mental disease, 
no special instruction on automatism was required. 
It is apparent that, applying the reasoning of the Roust 
of Lords to the facts of this case, no claim of instructional 
error can be sustained. 
( d) The instructions requested by the appellant, assum-
ing that he was entitled to the instructions given, were not 
properly drawn and, therefore, the court could refuse to 
give them. Instruction No. 2 does not apprise the jury that 
the insane delusion must either prevent the defendant from 
appreciating the nature and quality of his act, or knowing 
right from wrong, or adhering to the right. The instruction, 
therefore, standing alone, is meaningless without somehow 
being tied in with one of the above elements. Further, the 
instruction is extremely ambiguous and badly drafted so 
that it could only be confusing to the jury. Under these 
circumstances, it is well within the province of the court to 
reject the instructions. In Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 
4th Ed., Sec. 663, it is stated: 
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"The court may reject a requested instruction which 
docs not find support in the evidence, or which is not 
correct as a matter of law, even though modification 
or explanation would remove the defects, and make it 
applicable to the case. 
Instructions 7 and 2 fail to advise the jury that where the 
delusional rule is applicable, it must appear that the delu-
sion was the cause of the act committed. The insane delu-
sion must be related to the crime committed and be a delu-
sion with respect to the circumstances surrounding that 
crime. Clark and Marshall, Crimes, 6th Ed., Sec. 6.02. 
Neither of these instructions properly related the hallucina-
tion or delusion to that requirement, assuming that such an 
instruction is ever proper. 
Further, Instruction 11, which also has the defects men-
tioned as to Instructions 2 and 7, is simply not a correct 
statement of the law. Provocation is immaterial in an 
hallucinatory or delusionary instruction unless the provoca-
tion would justify a defense to the crime. Further, this in-
struction is argumentative. 
It is apparent, therefore, that since the instructions were 
not properly couched in terms of the rule of law that appel-
lant sought the court to present to the jury, the trial court 
committed no error in rejecting the instructions. 
( e) It is submitted that the evidence in the instant case 
was of such a nature as not to justify an instruction on 
delusions or hallucinations, assuming that the court feels 
that there is any validity to such principle as it relates to the 
law of insanity. 
The testimony of the appellant while on the stand raised 
nothing concerning hallucinations or delusions. The ap-
pellant merely indicated he could not remember anything 
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from the time he turned off the light the second time until 
he turned it on and saw that the victim had been stabbed 
(R.266). 
Further, at the time the appellant gave his statement to 
the police, he expressly indicated that he did not believe 
there were others in the room ( R. 512) and indicated that 
he believed that he had stabbed the victim ( R. 513). The 
only evidence at all indicative of hallucinations is the oral 
statement of Officer Cahoon that the appellant had said 
that he had stabbed some "individuals" ( R. 518). Based 
upon that statement, Dr. Robert Mohr testified that pos-
sibly the appellant \\"aS participating in the delusions which 
the victim Kenny Vaught was apparently having. However, 
the appellant could not say what his delusions were or even 
remember if he had them. There was, therefore, no predi-
cate upon which to claim that he was under such a delusion 
that, had the delusion been true, it would have been a 
defense. The substance of the hallucination or delusion was 
locked up by the appellant's convenient amnesia. 
In State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 ( 1931), th~ 
court felt that such limited evidence did not warrant an 
instruction on hallucinations. It observed: 
"* * * The only suggestion that his mind was so 
affected is his statement to the peace officers that when 
James Green arose from his chair he thought he heard 
something rattle or snap and he thought James Gree~ 
had a gun in his pocket. Obviously, that statement is 
not evidence that the appellant's mind was afff'.etcd 
with delusions or hallucinations. What the defendant 
thought may or may not be true, and, even if it were 
true, the defendant did not claim in his statement to 
peace officers, so far as appears, that he believed James 
Green was about to injure him. Upon this record the 
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defendant was not entitled to have the jury instructed 
on the law as applied to delusions or hallucinations." 
In United States u. Lopez-~M alaue, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 341, 
15 C.l\I.R. 341 ( 1954), the Court of Military Appeals 
ruled that amnesia, standing by itself, was not a sufficient 
issuc to submit the question of insanity to the court. In the 
instant case amnesia was about all the defendant could 
claim and the court still instructed on insanity. Under such 
circumstances, it can hardly be claimed that the appellant 
was entitled to an additional instruction on hallucinations 
and delusions. 
A case similar to the instant one, United States u. Olvera, 
4 U.S.C.l\I.A. 134, 15 C.l\J.R. 134 ( 1954), involved a case 
11 here the accused was found guilty of an assault whereby 
g1nious bodily harm was intentionally afflicted. The evi-
dence showed that the accused had been drinking prior to 
the incident and had engaged in a scuffle with the victim 
11 here the victim got stabbed. The appellant's only recount 
of the incident \\·as that he remembered being in the pres-
ence of the victim before the crime was committed and then 
immediately after the stabbing found himself standing with 
a knife in his hand and observed the victim oozing blood. 
A doctor testified that it was possible for the appellant to 
have received a blow on the head which could produce 
amnesia. Under these facts, which bear a very similar rela-
tionship to those now before the court, the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals ruled that there was no requirement to instruct 
upon the defense of insanity. The court said that amnesia 
plus intoxication in nowise equates to an issue of legal in-
sanity and that amnesia in and of itself is a neutral circum-
stancc. 
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In the instant case, where the only evidence shows am-
nesia and unspecified possibilities of some hallucination due 
to an unknown degree of intoxication produced by toluene 
and where the appellant himself on the stand refuses to 
acknowledge any hallucinations, and previously has stated 
that he did not believe the hallucinations the victim was 
suffering, it is apparent that there is insufficient evidence 
to submit the matter to the jury.4 
Based upon all of the arguments above stated, it is sub-
mitted that the trial court did not err in refusing to give 
appellant's Instructions 2, 7 and 11. 5 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR I:'\ 
REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANTS INSTRUCTIONS Oi\ 
VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. 
The appellant requested the trial court to instruct the 
jury on the alleged lesser included offense of voluntary man-
slaughter which the court refused to do ( R. 31). The ap-
pellant contends that this failure was error. It is well settled 
'In Moore v. D. & R.G.W. Rr., 4 U.2d 255, 292 P.2d 849 (1956), this 
court observed that where medical testimony remained in the realm of possi· 
bilities, it was insufficient to warrant jury consideration. In the instant case. 
where the defendant at least had the burden of going forward with proof to 
justify his affirmative defense and where the evidence is both speculative and 
uncertain and, in fact, unrelated to the legal principle involved, it can hardly 
be said that the trial court abused its discretion in not submitting the matter of 
hallucinations and delusions to the jury where they were otherwise instructed 
on the defense of insanity and given clear instructions on the requirement of 
finding an intent. 
•The State concedes for the purposes of this case that the voluntary use.of 
drugs which produces some mental derangement may be the basis for an in· 
sanity defense since the court, in fact, instructed on that defense. However, the 
State does not concede that in future cases such action would allow the lfl· 
vocation of a defense of insanity. Cases from other jurisdictions appear W say 
that intoxication from alcohol and drugs is not such a "disease of the mind d 
as will justify an insanity instruction. People v. Alexander, 182 Cal.App.:! 
281, 6 Cal. Rep. 153 ( 1960). It should be submitted that such act10n is ,not 
the type of "mental disease" that gives rise to the insanity plea. See Hall; G~.n­
eral Principles of Criminal Law, 2d Ed. ( 1960) ; U.S. v. Hurt (D.C. Cir. 
1965), as yet unreported (narcotic addiction). 
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in this jurisdiction that the court need not give an instruc-
tion on a lesser included offense unless it is clearly raised by 
the e\ idence. Thus, in State v. Angle, 61 Utah 432, 215 
Pac. 5'.~ 1 ( 1923), it was stated: 
"It is a \\·ell-settled rule that instructions as to lower 
grades of the offenses charged should be given when 
\\·arranted by the evidence. It is equally well settled 
that in a criminal prosecution error canot be predi-
cated on the omission of the trial court to instruct as to 
lesser grades of the offense charged where there is no 
c\'ickncc to reduce the offense to a lesser grade. 1 
Blashficlcl, Instructions to Juries (2d Ed.) § 408." 
Sec also State v. Mitchell, 3 U.2cl 70, 278 P.2d 618 ( 1955). 
In the instant case, it is apparent that there was no evi-
dence before the jury upon which they could find the ele-
ments of manslaughter. Section 76-30-5, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, defines voluntary manslaughter as being the 
killing of a human being without malice. Section 76--30-
'i ( 1 ) acids the following clements: 
"Voluntary, upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat 
of passion." 
In State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 ( 1963), this 
court observed as to the definition, "This statutory defini-
tion is but declaratory of the common law." The court was 
manifestly correct in its conclusion. Clark and Marshall, 
Crimes, 6th Ed., Section 10.11; Kenny's Outlines of Crimi-
nal Law, 18th Ed. ( 1962) Section 6. It is well established 
that if the circumstances show the killer acts not in the heat 
of blood but from malice, that no issue of manslaughter is 
raised. Clark and ~Iarshall, supra, pages 620-621; 1 
IL111 kins, Pleas of the Crown, Chap. 11, Para. 18. Addi-
tionally, in People z•. Calton, 5 Utah 451, 16 Pac. 902 
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( 1888), this court upheld an instruction on \'Oluntary man-
slaughter which advised the jury that to reduce homicidr 
to manslaughter on the grounds of passion or sudden quar-
rel, the provocation must be such that would give rise to an 
irresistible passion in the mind of a reasonable person. See 
also Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, 18th Ed. ( 1962), 
p. 165. At common law, this provocation arose in four cir-
cumstances : 
1. Violent assault. 
2. Unlawful arrest. 
3. A killing in mutual combat, provided no unfair 
advantages taken. 
4. A killing by the husband of the wife's paramour 
upon the discovery of adultery. 
(Clark and Marshall, supra, page 619.) 
In the instant case, the killing occurred in none of these 
circumstances. The appellant did not testify that there was 
any sudden quarrel or heat of passion that caused him to 
kill the deceased. Further, none of the common law pro-
vocations which will reduce a higher degree of murder to a 
lesser degree are present. Under these circumstances, the 
court was correct in refusing the instruction on voluntary 
manslaughter. See also State v. Mitchell, supra, where the 
court noted that it was proper to have refused the apprl-
lant's request for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. 
In State v. Gallegos, 16 U.2d 192, 396 P.2d 414 (1964), 
the appellants argue that they were prejudiced on an 
erroneous instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The 
court noted that not only does voluntary manslaughter re-
quire a specific intent but that it must be shown that the 
killing was committed as a result of a quarrel or under the 
heat of passion under circumstances which would provoke 
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a reasonable man. The court held that no error could be 
claimed from the erroneous instruction given where the 
c\'idence did not show that the killing arose out of any 
quarrel or heat of passion. Consequently, under the facts 
ancl circumstances of the instant case, it cannot be con-
tenclecl that the instruction on voluntary slaughter was 
propn. 
The appellant relies upon the case of State u. Green, 
'upra. for the proposition that a manslaughter instruction 
11 oulcl be proper. It is admitted that the Green case pro-
\'icles that where the mental condition of the accused is such 
that he cannot form the requisite intent, it may reduce the 
crimc of murder in the first degree to that of manslaughter. 
Ho11·e-cr, this case relates to the defense of partial responsi-
bilitv. Even so, the case notes that the killing must occur 
under the common law circumstances. Thus, the court 
noted: 
"If appellant killed the deceased in the heat of pas-
sion and 11·ithout malice, he may be guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter, provided, of course, that he was legally 
responsible." 
The court went on to note that there was sufficient evidence 
that the killing occurred in the heat of passion. It is assumed 
that the killing also occurred under circumstances that 
would be within the common law excuses which would 
justify a person acting in such a manner under the heat of 
passion. 
It should be noted, however, that the Green case is abso-
lutely erroneous in its analysis of the impact of mental 
discasc short of insanity. If there is an impairment such 
that thc accused cannot form the requisite intent, then the 
proper i11struction is a lesser included offense where intent 
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is not required. There is no question but \\'hat intent is re-
quired in the crime of manslaughter. State v. Gallegos, 
supra, and cases cited therein. Manslaughter and second 
degree murder, therefore, require the same intent. The dif-
ference between the crimes is that manslaughter arises out 
of the heat of passion or quarrel which would justify the 
action of a reasonable person. Therefore, an appropriate 
instruction \\'Ould not be on voluntary manslaughter, but 
rather on involuntary manslaughter where intent is not 
required. No instruction on involuntary manslaughter was 
requested. 
It is apparent, that the trial court acted properly in re-
fusing an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. 
Further, the State submits that the concept of partial 
insanity which says that an individual can be sane but still 
not have the requisite intent is scientifically erroneous. It 
should be noted that the English courts recognize the con-
cept not based on any theory as absurd as saying that a per-
son can be sane but still lack the mental ability to intend. 
but rather on the grounds that equity may warrant relieving 
a person from the severity of a first degree murder sentence 
if, though legally sane, he suffers from some form of mental 
disease that could have in some way affected his actions. 
Williams, Criminal Law, 2d Ed., The General Part, Sec 
172, 173. In England, it is called "diminished responsi-
bility" and is a matter, not of judicial interpretation, but 
legislative enactment (Homicide Act 195 7). Many courts 
and authorities reject the doctrine of partial responsibility 
on the grounds that it is impossible to compartmentalize 
a person's mind and say that he could understand the nature 
of the act, adhere to the right, and understand that what he 
was doing was wrong, but not form the requisite intent. 
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Fisher l'. United States, 328 U.S. 463 ( 1946). Common-
wealth v. Heidler, 191 Pa. 375, 43 A. 211, states: 
"To say that a man is insane to an extent which in-
capacitates him from fully forming an intent to take 
life, yet enables him to fully and maliciously form an 
intent to do great bodily harm without a purpose to 
take life, is absurd, for the one involves the same test 
of responsibility as the other, the ability to distinguish 
between right and wrong." 
Sec also W eihofcn and Overholser, .Mental Disorder Afject-
ing the Degree of a Crime, 56 Yale Law Journal 959, 978; 
43 Cornell Law Quarterly 283 ( 195 7). Based on what is 
noted above, it is submitted that the very basis of the Green 
opinion for partial responsibility is erroneous. 
Finally, as noted, what the Green case involves is the 
throry of partial responsibility but the appellant did not 
request an instruction on that grounds. No instruction was 
gi\'en to the jury or requested which would advise the jury 
that if they found the accused was suffering from some 
mental disorder short of insanity, they could consider it, to 
the extent that it affected his ability to form the required 
intrnt in committing the crime. Obviously, therefore, there 
i~ disparity between the appellant's position on appeal and 
that at the time of trial. The Green case might support a 
proposition for partial insanity reducing a murder in the 
first degree to manslaughter but, in the absence of a claim 
for the doctrine of partial insanity and an instruction to the 
jury, it is no authority for an instruction on manslaughter in 
this case. 
The appellant, having failed to raise the issue of partial 
insanity, cannot for the first time on appeal claim the Green 
case somehow required an instruction on voluntary man-
slaughter. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 1 
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JL'RY ON A LESSER!\!. 
CLUDED OFFENSE OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER. 
The appellant contends that the trial court committed 
error in giving its instructions on the lesser crime of second 
degree murder. The instruction as actually given by thr 
court reads as follows: (Instruction No. 5, R. 44.) 
"Before you can find the defendant guilty of murder 
in the second degree, you must believe from the e\'i-
dence in this case and beyond a reasonable doubt the 
following: 
1. That on or about the 28th day of May, 1964. 
at Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant Ray 
Wayne Pierce killed Kenneth Jack Vaught; 
2. That the killing was with malice aforethought; 
3. That when the defendant struck with the fatal 
knife he had a specific design or intention, thought out 
beforehand, to cause great bodily injury to the de-
ceased, or an intention or design thought out before-
hand to do an act, knowing the reasonable and natural 
consequences thereof would be likely to cause great 
bodily injury to the deceased; 
4. That the killing was unlawful; 
5. That the said Kenneth Jack Vaught died within 
a year and a day after the cause of death was admin-
istered. 
The burden is upon the State to prove to your satis-
faction and beyond a reasonable doubt that all of the 
foregoing elements of the crime of murder in the 
second degree are present in this case, and if the State 
shall have failed to so satisfy your minds upon one or 
more of the aforesaid elements, you cannot find the 
defendant guilty of murder in the second degree. 
If the State does prove each and every one of the 
foregoing elements, as aforesaid, then and in that everit 
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the State would be entitled to a verdict of guilty against 
the defendant, as the evidence so indicates." 
When the instruction is read as a whole, it is obvious 
that the court neither commented on the evidence or in-
'tructed the jury that as a matter of fact the defendant 
strnck the fatal blow that killed Kenneth Vaught. It is 
ob\'ious that what the court in fact did is set forth each of 
the clements necessary to pro\'e the crime of second degree 
murder. The first charge requires the jury to find that the 
defendant in fact killed Kenneth Vaught. The third in-
\truction merely requires the jury to find that he had the 
proper intent at the time the killing took place. This is a 
substantially different situation from that involved in the 
case of State v. Green, supra, which the appellant relies on. 
In the Green case the court instructed the jury that it was 
not controverted that the defendant shot the deceased. 78 
Ctah, at 589. There the jury was precluded from deter-
mining the fact of the killing itself. In the instant case the 
instructions, when taken as a whole, clearly advise the jury 
that the issues must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and that they are the triers of the fact. The rest of Instruc-
tion ~o. 5 at the top of page 45 clearly requires the State 
to prove each and every element. 
It is well settled that instructions must be taken as a 
ll'hole. State v. AfcCoy, 15 Utah 136, 49 Pac. 420 ( 1897); 
State l'. Hendricks, 123 Utah 267, 258 P.2d 452; State v. 
Ei•ans, 107 Utah 1, 151 P.2d 196. In State v. Siddoway, 
61 Utah 189, 211 Pac. 968 ( 1922), this court noted: 
"* * * \Vhen instructions as a whole fairly present the 
law, clearly present the issues involved, and contain 
no harmful or prejudicial errors, the verdict in a crimi-
nal case must stand. The statute that provides that 
technical errors in criminal cases shall be disregarded 
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is mandatory, and, unless upon a review of all the f1i-
dence we arc satisfied that a miscarriage of justice has 
resulted, we have no right to interfere with the jury's 
verdict. * * *" 
It is apparent, therefore, that the allegation in the ap-
pellant's brief that the instruction as given precluded the 
jury from weighing the fact of whether the appellant did 
stab Kenny Vaught is without merit. 
It is submitted that in any event the appellant is in no 
position to complain, since no exception was taken to thf 
court's instruction on that basis. The record reflects that 
the only exception taken to Instruction No. 5 by the appel-
lant was a claim that it was error to only instruct upon the 
intention to inflict bodily harm ( R. 500). It is submitted, 
therefore, that since the appellant did not take exception 
to the instruction given, he may not complain of any error 
in this case. 
It is well established that before an appellant may claim 
error in the instructions given by the trial court, exceptions 
must be taken, 77-37-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; 
State v. Anderson, 75 Utah 496, 286 Pac. 645; State v. 
Cooper, 114 Utah 517, 207 P.2d 764 ( 1949); State v. Cobo, 
90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952. Most recently, in State v. Smith, 
401 P.2d 445 (Utah 1965), this court noted that in thr 
absence of an objection, errors will normally not be re· 
viewed on appeal. 
Since the appellant failed to take appropriate exceptions 
and the error, if any, is at best doubtful, there is no basis for 
reversal. 
Finally, it is submitted that the instruction given by the 
1 
court could in no way be prejudicial. Section 77-42-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
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"After hearing an appeal the court must give judg-
ment without regard to errors or defects which do not 
affect the substantial rights of the parties. If error has 
been committed, it shall not be presumed to have re-
sulted in prejudice. The court must be satisfied that it 
has that effect before it is warranted in reversing the 
judgment." 
In State v. La nos, 63 Utah 151, 223 Pac. 1065, this court 
ruled that remarks of the judge, which might have been 
construed to mean that it was not necessary to prove that 
the defendant knew that the check which was the subject 
of the action was forged, did not require reversal in the 
absence of a showing of clear prejudice and where other 
facts and circumstances indicated the jurors were aware of 
their prerogatives. See also State v. Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 
240 P.2d 504, and State v. Hines, 6 U.2d 126, 307 P.2d 887.6 
The facts in the instant case show that the appellant, 
immediately after commission of the crime, stated that he 
"killed" or "stabbed" the deceased ( R. 117, 122, 154). The 
n·iclcnce did not disclose any other person in the room with 
the appellant at the time the stabbing occurred. The ap-
pellant's knife was the obvious murder weapon. In his state-
ment to the police, which appears to have been admitted in 
evidence as part of the appellant's testimony, the appellant 
expressly stated, in response to the question as to whether he 
believed he stabbed the deceased ( R. 513) : 
"Q. Do you believe you stabbed him? 
A. Yes." 
Additionally, the whole plea of the appellant appears to 
have been one of insanity. At one part in the trial, appel-
lant's counsel expressly asked a question of a witness which 
"l\.,th of these cases also stand for the proposition that the failure to take 
"ill'' upriate exceptions "ill preclude a claim of error on appeal. 
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question affirmatively stated facts that the appellant had 
done the stabbing ( R. 340). Further, the appellant on the 
stand acknowledged that he had told the police that he 
believed he had stabbed the deceased and acknowledged 
that it was the truth (R. 299). The argument of appellant 
in summation assumed that the appellant had killed the 
deceased, and argued, however, that the appellant was not 
sane, and could not form the required intent. Thus, the total 
posture of the case was such that the appellant could in no 
way have been prejudiced by the slight reference to the trial 
court's instruction, which is now claimed as error on appeal. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS ON INTOXICA· 
TION DO NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL. 
The appellant contends that the trial court committed 
error in instructing the jury on the effect of intoxication on 
the appellant's criminality. The only portion of the instruc-
tion assailed by the appellant is that which states that in-
toxication not only does not make a criminal act any the less 
criminal but may be a factor in aggravation. 
At the outset it should be noted that the appellant has 
not indicated how this could conceivably have prejudiced 
him. The court instructed only on the crimes of first and 
second degree murder. The jury convicted on the lesser 
included offense. Consequently, the accused was given the 
benefit of the doubt by the jury. Further, it is generally held , 
that intoxication, which is of course relevant in a charge of 
first degree murder to the elements of premeditation, 
malice, and intent, State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d 
1050 ( 1931); State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac. 
1071; Hopt v. Utah, 104 U.S. 631 ( 1881); will not reduce 
criminal culpability to manslaughter. Second degree mur-
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clrr is the lowest degree of criminality to which intoxication 
11ill normally reduce a charge of first degree murder. In 
12 A.LR. 888, it is stated: 
"The rule in this country has, however, been modi-
fied in very few states, and the great weight of au-
thority is that intoxication will not reduce a homicide 
from murder to manslaughter." 
In 79 A.LR. 904, it is observed: 
"The great weight of authority, it is pointed out in 
the earlier annotation, is that intoxication will not 
reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter." 
Since the jury in the instant case found the appellant 
guilty of the lowest degree of murder upon which they were 
instructed, it cannot be said that the appellant was preju-
diced by the instruction that voluntary intoxication may be 
an aggravating factor. Further, it is apparent that the 
instruction as given clearly apprised the jury that they could 
consider intoxication in determining the accused's ability to 
premeditate or form the required intent. The instruction 
as given left no doubt in the jury's mind as to the effect of 
intoxication. The statement as to aggravation would only 
have been relevant had the jury found that intoxication had 
no effect upon the appellant's ability to premeditate or to 
form the required intent. Clearly, therefore, the instruc-
tion as given could hardly be claimed to have deprived the 
appellant of his defense of intoxication. 
To the extent that the trial court instructed the jury that 
intoxication may be an aggravating factor, it did no more 
than restate the common law rule. First, it is well settled 
that intoxication in and of itself is no defense to a prosecu-
tion for homicide, 12 A.LR. 869. Its relevancy is only on 
the question of premeditation, malice, and intent. At com-
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mon law, it was generally stated that intoxication could 
1 
have an aggravating effect upon the crime. Thus, in 15 Am. 
J ur., Criminal Law, Sec. 338, it is stated: 
"At common law it is held that drunkenness not onh 
docs not palliate the offense, but is an aggravation of 
the wrong committed." 
That this was the general accepted principal at common 
law appears in substantial authority; Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Beard (1920), A.C. 479, 12 A.L.R. 846: 
12 A.L.R. 866; Blackburn v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 638. 
255 S.W. 99 ( 1923) ; 3 Coke, Institutes 46; Hale's Pleas nl 
the Crown, Vol. 1, p. 32; Blackstone, Commentaries, Bonk 
4, Chapter 2, Sec. 3; Singh, History of the Defense 11! 
Drunkenness in English Criminal Law, 49 L.Q. Rev .. 5l0 
( 1933). In People v. Rogers, 18 N.Y. 9 ( 1858), the l\c11 
York court early noted that a person who voluntarily intoxi· 
cates himself to such an extent that it results in the com· 
mission of crime certainly is morally indifferent to the righb 
of other citizens and, therefore, blameworthy. In Pcop/1 
v. Roberts, 19 Mich. 408 ( 1870), it is observed: 
"He must be held to have purposely blinded hi' 
moral perceptions, and set his will free from the con· 
trol of reason - to have suppressed the guards and 
invited the mutiny; and should therefore be held re· 
sponsible as well for the vicious excesses of the 11il~ 
thus set free, as for the acts clone by its prompting. 
Thus, there is substantial early precedent for the exact 
proposition the court presented to the jury. It is, of course. 
recognized that a number of cases take the position that 
drunkenness in and of itself is a neutral fact which docs not 
necessarily aggravate the crime. Clark and Marshall. 
Crimes, 6th Ed., Sec. 6.09, p. 386. In view of this latter 
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precedent, \\'hich seems to be the more modem view, it may 
be the better practice not to refer to the question of aggra-
\ation, since, as a practical matter, it is meaningless. How-
C\Cr, it is obvious that in the context of this case, and when 
\irn eel as against the instruction given as a whole, it was not 
prejudicial. 
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CONCLUSION 
The jury in the instant case heard a substantial amount 
of testimony, both pro and con, relating to the criminal re-
sponsibility of the appellant. They had full opportunity to 
observe the witnesses, the appellant himself, and to judge 
the facts surrounding the commission of the crime. In doing 
so, they apparently determined that the appellant was not 
guilty of murder in the first degree, but that he had suffi. 
cient responsibility and should be held chargeable for mur· 
der in the second degree. When examining the record asa 
whole, it cannot be doubted but that substantial justice was 
done. The instructional errors complained of by the appel· 
!ant have no legal merit. Some of the claims now raised on 
appeal were so insignificant at trial as not to provoke ob-
jection or to warrant the appellant in advocating that posi· 
tion. Further, the evidence in support of the claims of 
instructional error hardly gives substance to the appellant's 
position. The overwhelming weight of legal precedent 
shows a firm and substantial basis for the trial court's in· 
structions and strongly supports the respondent's position 
that there is no basis to reverse the instant decision. Th~ 
court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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